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Like most other Western industrialized countries, Sweden will in the
near future face the ﬁnancial burden from the combined eﬀect of large
birth cohorts reaching retirement age, increased longevity, and a trend to-
ward early retirement. An obvious way to ease this ﬁnancial pressure is to
increase labor supply among older workers by providing economic incen-
tives to stay in the labor force. Although this was one of the main motives
behind the recent major reform of Sweden’s public old-age pension sys-
tem, there are, to our knowledge, no previous studies examining the link be-
tween the economic incentives inherent in the income security system and
the ﬁnances of the public sector in Sweden.
In this study we use an econometric model of the retirement decision de-
veloped in Palme and Svensson (2004) to simulate the public ﬁnance im-
plications of three hypothetical reforms of Sweden’s income security sys-
tem. In these simulations the labor supply response to the reform among
older workers is taken into account. Changes in total payments from the
public income security system (including labor market insurance pro-
grams) and tax payments (including payroll taxes, value added tax [VAT],
and income tax to the state and the municipalities) are considered sepa-
rately in the simulations.
One of the study’s emphases is to decompose the overall change in the ﬁ-
nances of the public sector into a mechanical and a behavioral component.
The mechanical component is deﬁned as the change in the ﬁnances of the
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a result of the reform. The behavioral eﬀect is deﬁned as the change that
occurs as a result of changes in retirement behavior.
In the ﬁrst hypothetical reform, the early and normal retirement ages (60
and 65, respectively, in the current system) are delayed by three years. This
implies that the actuarial adjustments in the pension scheme and the prob-
ability of being eligible for beneﬁts from a labor market insurance program
(disability, sickness, or unemployment insurance) are delayed by three
years. In the second reform, an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent per year
of early withdrawal before the normal retirement age is applied to all in-
come security programs. Although this adjustment is very similar to the ac-
tuarial adjustment in the current public pension scheme and some occu-
pational pensions, the adjustment is also applied to the labor market
insurance programs under the second reform policy regime. Finally, in the
third reform, the current income security system is replaced by a pension
beneﬁt that replaces 60 percent of average earnings during the best forty
years if the pension is claimed at the normal retirement age (65). The pen-
sion can be claimed from age 60 with an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent
for each year of early withdrawal. Beneﬁts from labor market insurance pro-
grams could no longer be used to ﬁnance early exit from the labor market.
Although these reforms were chosen for the purpose of the cross-
country comparison in this volume, rather than being realistic policy al-
ternatives for Sweden, we believe that the results have relevance for the cur-
rent public policy debate on the income security system in Sweden. Sweden
has recently implemented a reform of its public old-age pension system.
One of the main features of the reformed system (see, for example, Palmer
2001 for an overview of the reform) is that beneﬁts are indexed to follow the
growth in the average nominal wage rate rather than consumer prices. This
means that beneﬁt levels will be reduced if the growth rate in the economy
falls below the norm. Hence, the type of reductions in beneﬁt levels con-
sidered as reforms in this study is automatic, rather than discretionary, un-
der the postreform pension system in Sweden. Labor supply responses
studied in this paper can, therefore, be an important stabilization of public
ﬁnances under the new public pension system.
There are several issues related to reforms of income security systems
that are excluded from the analysis and left for further research. We do not
model changes in household savings behavior, which is likely to be an im-
portant response to beneﬁt cuts in the income security system. We also ig-
nore potentially important general equilibrium eﬀects on diﬀerent prices
in the economy, which may, in turn, inﬂuence public ﬁnances.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 gives a brief
overview of Sweden’s income security system. Section 10.3 describes the
data, gives a short description of the empirical model, and presents results
from the estimation of the empirical model. Section 10.4 presents the hy-
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tion methodology. The results from the simulations are presented in sec-
tion 10.5. Section 10.6 concludes.
10.2 Sweden’s Income Security System
The income security system in Sweden consists of three parts: the public
old-age pension system, the occupational pension schemes, and the com-
pulsory labor market insurance programs. These programs are, to about
the same extent, used for ﬁnancing exits from the labor market. In this sec-
tion, we give a brief description of how these programs are constructed.1
We start with the public old-age pension programs and the occupational
pension schemes. We then describe the disability, sickness, and unemploy-
ment insurance programs.
10.2.1 The Public Old-Age Pension System
Sweden’s public old-age pension system consisted of two parts during
the period studied: a basic pension and a supplementary pension (ATP).2
All Swedish citizens are entitled to the basic pension, which is unrelated to
previous earnings. The normal retirement age for this beneﬁt is 65, but it
can be claimed from age 60 with a permanent actuarial reduction of 0.5
percent for each month of early withdrawal. If the beneﬁt is claimed be-
ginning after age 65, the level is permanently increased by 0.7 percent for
each month of delayed withdrawal up to age 70.
All social insurance programs in Sweden are indexed by the basic
amount (BA), which follows the consumer price index (CPI) closely. In the
year 2001, the level of one BA was 36,900 Swedish Kronor (SEK).3The level
of the basic pension is 96 percent of a BA for a single pensioner and 78.5
percent for married. The basic pension also contains a survivor’s pension.
The supplementary pension is related to a worker’s previous earnings.
The amount of the beneﬁt is calculated using the following formula:
(1) Yi   0.6   AP i   min    , 1    BA,
where AP iis individual average pension points, BA is the basic amount, and
Niis the number of years an individual has recorded covered income greater
than zero. The average of pension points is calculated as the average of an-
nual earnings between 1 BA and the social security ceiling of 7.5 BA of the
worker’s ﬁfteen best years. The normal retirement age for the supplemen-
Ni  
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1. For a more complete description, see Palme and Svensson (1999, 2004).
2. The description is based on the rules pertaining for persons covered in the study. Sweden
introduced a reform of the public old-age pension system in the 1990s.
3. In 2001 the exchange rate was about 10 SEK/US$.tary pension is 65. The actuarial adjustments for early and delayed with-
drawal are the same as for the basic pension.
10.2.2 Occupational Pensions
Sweden has a highly unionized labor market. Around 95 percent of all
employees are covered by central agreements between the unions and the
employers’ confederations. These agreements regulate pension programs
and other insurance programs for the employees. There are four main
agreements, each with its own pension scheme. The private sector has one
scheme for blue collar and one for white collar workers. In the public sec-
tor, there is one scheme for employees in central government and one for
employees in county and local governments.
The private sector blue collar workers included in our sample are under
two diﬀerent occupational pension schemes. Those born between 1927 and
1931 are covered by the STP scheme. The beneﬁt in this scheme is 10 per-
cent of the average annual earnings below the social security ceiling of the
three best years of the ﬁve years between age 55 and 59. At least three years
of earnings between 55 and 59 are required to be eligible for the pension.
The beneﬁts are paid out starting when the worker is aged 65. The STP plan
is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis.
In 1996 the STP scheme was replaced by a fully funded scheme, covering
workers born after 1940. The cohorts between 1938 and 1940 are covered
by a transition scheme; those who were born between 1932 and 1937 can
choose between STP and the transition scheme. The beneﬁts in the transi-
tion scheme are calculated as 10 percent of annual earnings under the so-
cial security ceiling after age 30 plus the amount that the worker receives
from the fully funded system. The contributions to the fully funded scheme
were 2.0 percent of annual earnings between 1996 and 1999. The contribu-
tion rate was increased to 3.5 percent in 2000.
White collar workers in the private sector are, in general, covered by the
ITP and ITPK schemes. The ITP pension replaces 10 percent of a worker’s
earnings the year before retirement up to the social security ceiling of 7.5
BA, 65 percent of earnings between 7.5 and 20 BAs, and 32.5 percent be-
tween 20 and 30 BAs. The normal retirement age for the ITP plan is 65, but
the beneﬁt can be claimed with an actuarial adjustment from age 60. ITPK
is a fully funded scheme that was introduced in 1977. The contribution rate
is 2 percent of gross annual earnings.
Until 1992, employees in central government were covered by a gross
pension scheme that replaced 65 percent of annual earnings the year be-
fore retirement. This scheme was replaced with a net pension that is simi-
lar to the ITP scheme. However, the beneﬁt is determined by the average of
annual earnings during the ﬁve years preceding retirement. Employees in
central government are also covered by a fully funded scheme that was in-
416 Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svenssontroduced in 1992. The contribution rate in this scheme is 1.7 percent of the
annual wage sum.
Finally, employees in county councils and local government are covered
by a gross pension, which is determined by the average of annual earnings
of the ﬁve best years of the seven years preceding retirement. It replaces 
96 percent below 1 BA, 78.5 percent between 1 and 2.5 BA, 60 percent be-
tween 2.5 and 3.5 BAs, 64 percent between 3.5 and 7.5 BAs, 65 percent
between 7.5 and 20 BAs, and 32.5 percent between 20 and 30 BAs. It can be
claimed, with an actuarial adjustment, from age 60.
10.2.3 Labor Market Insurance Programs
There are three important labor market insurance programs: disability
insurance (DI), sickness insurance (SI), and unemployment insurance
(UI). Eligibility for disability insurance requires that the individual’s ca-
pacity to work is permanently reduced by at least 25 percent. Full com-
pensation requires that the capacity is completely lost. A physician deter-
mines work capacity in general, but eligibility for disability insurance is
ultimately determined by the local social insurance administration. Be-
tween 1972 and 1991, disability insurance could be granted for labor mar-
ket reasons, that is, no requirement of reduced work capacity was needed.
The disability beneﬁts consist of a basic pension and a supplementary
pension (ATP). The level of the basic pension is the same as for the old-age
scheme; the supplementary pension is determined in the same way as for
the old-age scheme with no actuarial reduction for early retirement. As-
sumed pension points are calculated for each year between the date of dis-
ability and age 64.
Sickness insurance replaces a share of lost earnings due to temporary ill-
nesses, up to the social security ceiling. The replacement level has been
changed on several occasions during the time period covered by this study.
In a reform in 1987, the replacement level was set to 90 percent of the
worker’s insured income. Since then, the replacement has been decreased
several times. The ﬁrst was in a reform in 1991. In 1996 it was set to 75 per-
cent of the insured income for long sickness spells, and in 1998 it was raised
to 80 percent.
The unemployment insurance beneﬁt consists of two parts: one basic
part, which is unrelated to a worker’s insured income, and one part that re-
quires membership in an unemployment beneﬁt fund and is related to a
worker’s insured income. Unemployed workers who actively search for a
new job are eligible for compensation. The main diﬀerence between the
beneﬁt level in the unemployment and sickness insurance programs is the
income ceiling. The ceiling in the sickness insurance is the same as for other
parts of the social insurance system, while the ceiling in the unemployment
insurance is subject to discretionary changes, and is lower than the ceiling
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has also been changed on several occasions during the period analyzed in
this empirical example. These changes have roughly followed the changes
in the sickness insurance.
10.2.4 Income Taxes and Housing Allowances
Sweden went through a major income tax reform in 1991. Before the re-
form, all income was included in the same tax base and was taxed with a
proportional local government tax (around 30 percent, depending on mu-
nicipality) and a progressive national tax. The maximum marginal tax rate
was set to 75 percent. The main feature of the tax reform was that the tax
base was divided into capital income and earned income. Income from cap-
ital is taxed at the national level with a rate of 30 percent and earned in-
come is subject to a local government tax, and above a certain break point,
by a 20 percent national tax. The marginal tax rate was reduced consider-
ably.
Old age, disability, and survivor’s pensioners with low income are en-
titled to a housing allowance. In 1995, this allowance was at most 85 percent
of the housing cost, up to a ceiling. About 30 percent of all old-age pen-
sioners received housing allowances in 1995.
10.3 Empirical Model
We use an econometric model to predict the behavioral responses to the
policy reforms considered in this paper. For the current purpose, we pro-
vide a brief overview of data sources, the speciﬁcation of the empirical
model, estimation results, and results from the prediction of the behavioral
responses to the reform. A detailed description of these issues is given in
Palme and Svensson (2004).
10.3.1 Data
The data come from the Longitudinal Individual Data panel dataset
(LINDA). This dataset is a pure register sample, that is, no interviews were
made when the data were collected. The three main registers used to obtain
the LINDA panel are the Income and Wealth Register (Inkomst- och
Förmögenhetsstatistiken [IoF]), Population Census (Folk- och Bostads-
räkningen [FoB]),4 and the National Social Insurance Board Registers for
pension points (based on earnings).
The original sample for the LINDA panel is a random selection of about
300,000 individuals from the 1995 population register. The sampling pro-
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4. The FoB exists for every ﬁfth year between 1960 and 1990, and is obtained from mailed
questionnaires. Everyone living in Sweden is included in the FoB, and participation in the
census is compulsory.cedure used to update the panel backward and forward from 1995 is de-
signed so that each yearly cross-section of LINDA is also a random sample
of the Swedish population, that is, each individual has the same probabil-
ity of being included in the sample, irrespective of the type of household he
or she is living in.
The LINDA panel also contains information on the spouse of each in-
dividual originally included in the sample. In general, the same variables as
for the original individuals are also available for their spouses. There are
two, somewhat diﬀerent, deﬁnitions of spouse in LINDA. The ﬁrst deﬁni-
tion, used by the tax authorities, includes individuals who are either for-
mally married or are cohabiting and having children together. The second
deﬁnition refers to all spouses who, in the mailed questionnaire, have re-
ported that they are living together, that is, they share housing. This infor-
mation is only available for the years of the census (FoB). When calculat-
ing incentive variables for this analysis, we used the ﬁrst deﬁnition, since it
is available for all years.
In this study, we use two subsamples. In the ﬁrst, used for the estimation,
we select individuals born between 1927 and 1940. We further restricted the
sample to employees at age 50; that is, we exclude those who were self-
employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force at age 50. Table 10.1shows
the number of individuals remaining in the sample after diﬀerent steps in the
sample selection procedure. In the time dimension, we restrict the sample 
to the period 1983 to 1997. For this period we are able to observe the re-
tirement behavior using the detailed income components available. The sec-
ond sample is used for the policy simulations. This one is restricted to indi-
viduals born in 1940. In section 10.4 we describe this restricted sample.
We deﬁne a worker as retired the ﬁrst year when income from work is
permanently below one BA. We have also compared this deﬁnition of re-
tirement with one where we deﬁne the year of retirement as the ﬁrst year
when an individual starts to receive less income from work than pension
beneﬁts. It turned out that the similarity between these deﬁnitions for the
individuals in the sample was fairly good. However, since the former deﬁ-
nition of retirement is more in accordance with the general deﬁnition of the
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Table 10.1 Number of individuals remaining after each step in the sample selection
Men and
Men Women women
Individuals born 1927–40 22,375 21,948 44,323
Neither emigrated nor dead in 1983 22,055 21,798 43,853
Usable earnings histories 22,046 21,781 43,827
Not retired at age 50 20,364 19,576 39,940
Not retired in 1983 18,163 15,916 34,079
Employed in 1983 15,619 14,820 30,439date when the worker leaves the labor force, we used that in the empirical
analysis.
10.3.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The following retirement model was estimated:
(2) Rit    0    1ACCit    2ISW it    3AGEit    4PREARNit    5EARNit
   6PREARNit   EARNit    7SPEARNit      Xit    it,
where Ritis a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if year tis individual i’s
last year in the labor force, where ACCit is the measure of accrual at time t;
ISW it is the net present value of social security wealth discounted to time t;
AGEit represents the individual’s age either by a linear variable or by indi-
cators for each age; PREARNis the individual’s predicted earnings at time
tand the square of this measure; EARNis a measure of the individual’s life-
time earnings and its square; SPEARN is lifetime earnings of the spouse,
its square and the spouse’s net social security wealth discounted back to
time t; X is a set of individual characteristics, including marital status, ed-
ucation level (Educ1–Educ6), socioeconomic group (Occ1–Occ4) and indi-
cators for each of Sweden’s twenty-ﬁve counties (compare section 10.4 for
the construction of these variables).
The key variables are the measures of economic incentives described by
income security wealth (ISW) and ACC. Income security wealth is mea-
sured for each individual for each potential retirement age as
(3) ISW(r, t)  ∑
max age
s r
 s tEtB(s, r),
where   is the discount factor and EtB(s, r) is the expected beneﬁt at age s
if the worker retires at age r, that is,
(4) EtB(s, r)   p(s|t)q(s|b)BM(s, r)   p(s|t)[1   q(s|t)]BS(s, r) 
  [1   p(s|t)]q(s|t)S(s, r, t)
where BM(s, r) is the worker’s pension beneﬁt at age s if he or she is mar-
ried and retires at age r; BS(s, r) is the worker’s pension beneﬁt at age sif he
or she is not married and retires at age r; S(s, r, t) is the survivor’s beneﬁt
when the worker would have been aged s and retired at age r; p(s|t) is the
probability of survival at time s conditional on survival at time t; q(s|t) is
the probability of the spouse surviving at age s conditional on survival at
age t. S(s, r, t) depends on the spouse at time t as well as the retirement age
r, while BM(s, r) and BS(s, r) are not dependent on t, since we assume per-
fect foresight about wages. We also disregard the possibility of divorce.
Three alternative measures of ACC were used in the estimation. In the
policy simulations we use peak valueand option value.Peak value is deﬁned
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worker can expect in the future, provided that he or she stays in the labor
force. It is forward looking, not only in the sense that it considers all future
expected beneﬁt payments, but also in the sense that it considers all future
possible gains of staying in the labor force. This is also true for the option
value measure, but this measure includes additional parameters for the
subjective discount rate, the valuation of leisure, and a risk-aversion pa-
rameter. The accrual is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the utility
stream of retiring the current year versus at the optimal future date, that is,
it measures the value of the option of staying in the labor force. Palme and
Svensson (2004) describe how the additional parameters are estimated.
10.3.3 Estimation Results
Tables 10.2 and 10.3show the estimates for the models that we use in the
policy simulations for males and females, respectively. Each table contains
four diﬀerent speciﬁcations: for each of the two alternative accrual mea-
sures, one equation applies a linear speciﬁcation in age and one uses
dummy variables for each age.
The coeﬃcient estimates for the variables measuring economic incen-
tives—income security wealth for the sample individual and the spouse as
well as the alternative accrual measures—are of key importance in the pol-
icy simulations. Table 10.2 shows that the coeﬃcients estimate for each ac-
crual measure have the expected (negative) sign and are signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from zero in both models. The estimates for ISW, both for the sample
individual and the spouse, are, as expected, positive and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero in all four models.
The estimates for the sample of women are, as can be seen in table 10.3,
somewhat diﬀerent. Again, the estimates for the accrual measures are sig-
niﬁcant with the expected sign in all speciﬁcations. However, the estimates
of the ISW coeﬃcient are only signiﬁcant with the expected sign for the
sample individual in the peak value speciﬁcation with age dummies. The
estimates for the husband’s ISW are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and
the ISW coeﬃcient for the sample individual in the option value models is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with the unexpected sign.
10.4 Simulation Methodology
The aim of the simulation exercise is to study the ﬁnancial implications
of three hypothetical reforms when taking the change in retirement behav-
ior as a response to the reform into account. To do this, we will follow one
particular birth cohort—those born in 1940, going through four alterna-
tive policy regimes: one following from the current Swedish income secu-
rity system, and three following as a result of the hypothetical reforms of
the system.
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Peak value Option value
Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies
ACCR/106 –0.93 –0.92 –5.11 –6.74
(–10.12) (–9.94) (–9.39) (11.42)
ISW/106 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.24
(6.41) (6.43) (5.50) (4.16)
Lifetime earnings –2.76 –2.80 –2.43 –2.55
(–1.92) (–1.92) (–1.71) (–1.76)
Lifetime earnings2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12
(1.45) (1.39) (1.31) (1.58)
Predicted earnings 1.47 1.40 1.26 1.59
(0.93) (0.87) (0.80) (1.00)
Predicted earnings2 –0.09 –0.09 –0.08 –0.10
(–2.14) (–2.16) (–1.91) (–1.94)
Lifetime   Predicted 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.08
(0.91) (0.96) (0.83) (0.53)
(Lifetime   Predicted)2 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(–1.78) (–1.77) (–1.62) (–1.33)
Education2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
(6.91) (6.85) (6.92) (6.91)
Education3 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
(11.19) (10.99) (11.23) (11.24)
Education4 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15
(6.87) (6.75) (6.88) (7.04)
Education5 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(4.71) (4.44) (4.75) (4.73)
Education6 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(2.50) (2.41) (2.46) (2.59)
Occupation2 –0.17 –0.17 –0.17 –0.17
(–9.77) (–9.53) (–9.68) (–9.16)
Occupation3 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(1.38) (1.46) (1.42) (1.62)
Occupation4 –0.18 –0.19 –0.18 –0.19
(–8.68) (–8.78) (–8.82) (–8.90)
Age 0.11 0.11
(38.39) (33.28)
Married –0.05 –0.06 –0.04 –0.02
(–1.21) (–1.29) (–0.93) (–0.47)
Lifetime earn, spouse 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
(2.45) (2.77) (2.11) (2.63)
Lifetime earn, spouse2 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(–2.51) (–2.83) (–2.16) (–2.68)
ISW, spouse/106 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(3.01) (3.11) (2.98) (3.01)
Indicators for age No Yes No Yes
Indicators for counties Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1621 0.1841 0.1612 0.1844
Log likelihood –24,571 –23,928 –24,599 –23,920
Notes:T-values are in parentheses. Number of individuals  15,619; number of observations  127,390.Table 10.3 Results from probit regressions on individual retirement decision—women
Peak value Option value
Linear age Age dummies Linear age Age dummies
ACCR/106 –1.42 –1.29 –23.4 –24.0
(–10.39) (–9.69) (–20.43) (–21.67)
ISW/106 0.07 0.13 –0.47 –0.48
(1.27) (2.16) (–7.13) (–7.14)
Lifetime earnings –4.68 –4.60 –6.31 –6.22
(–2.47) (–2.34) (–3.39) (–3.25)
Lifetime earnings2 0.40 0.36 0.66 0.65
(5.07) (4.34) (7.32) (6.80)
Predicted earnings 5.94 6.02 5.53 8.82
(3.50) (3.38) (3.56) (3.56)
Predicted earnings2 –0.19 –0.22 –0.07 –0.08
(–3.05) (–3.20) (–1.26) (–1.47)
Lifetime   Predicted –0.19 –0.12 –0.46 –0.46
(–1.06) (–0.66) (–2.85) (–2.68)
(Lifetime   Predicted)2 –0.00 –0.00 0.00 0.00
(–0.37) (–0.38) (0.04) (0.19)
Education2 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08
(2.27) (1.80) (3.44) (2.96)
Education3 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09
(4.15) (3.87) (5.72) (5.52)
Education4 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09
(2.23) (1.70) (3.32) (2.78)
Education5 –0.00 –0.00 0.04 0.05
(–0.07) (–0.05) (1.74) (1.80)
Education6 –0.08 –0.09 –0.02 –0.04
(–2.75) (–3.04) (–0.82) (–1.10)
Occupation2 –0.11 –0.11 –0.03 –0.03
(–5.12) (–4.93) (–1.48) (–1.29)
Occupation3 –0.04 –0.04 –0.02 –0.01
(–1.81) (–1.52) (–0.67) (–0.42)
Occupation4 –0.13 –0.13 –0.21 –0.21
(–7.27) (–6.82) (–11.34) (–10.95)
Age 0.14 0.09
(50.07) (24.64)
Married 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.35
(4.61) (4.87) (4.96) (5.28)
Lifetime earn, spouse 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.30) (0.12) (0.27) (0.04)
Lifetime earn, spouse2 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
(–0.66) (–0.48) (–0.67) (–0.43)
ISW, spouse/106 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02
(–0.58) (–0.68) (–1.12) (–1.23)
Indicators for age No Yes No Yes
Indicators for counties Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1762 0.2004 0.1828 0.2083
Log likelihood –23,540 –22,850 –23,351 –22,624
Notes:T-values are in parentheses. Number of individuals  14,820; number of observations  123,979.Since the LINDA panel is a random sample of individuals,5 our sample
constitutes a random sample of individuals born in 1940, with the addi-
tional requirement that they should be employed or temporarily unem-
ployed at age 55, that is, the self-employed and those who were not in the la-
bor force were excluded. This selection resulted in a sample size of 2,148
(1,109 men and 1,039 women). Using the sampling weights of the dataset, it
can be shown that this sample represents 66 percent of the 1940 birth cohort
living in Sweden at age 55. In the calculations, as we will explain later, we will
also use information from 1,561 spouses of the individuals in the sample.
10.4.1 Diﬀerent States and IS Flows
We consider individual retirement behavior starting at age 56 up to age
79. In each year, an individual can exit from the labor force to either re-
tirement, in most cases ﬁnanced through the income security system, or to
death. Since these alternative states have very diﬀerent ﬁnancial implica-
tions, we will consider the two alternative states (retired or dead) for each
of the twenty-four years, that is, forty-eight diﬀerent states, ex post, for
each individual in the sample.
If the individual exits to retirement, there are, as we explained in section
10.2, diﬀerent possibilities for ﬁnancing retirement through the income se-
curity system. Ideally, it would have been desirable to consider all of the
diﬀerent paths to retirement and assign a probability to each of them. This
would, however, as is explained in Palme and Svensson (2004), involve an
unrealistic number of alternatives. Instead, as we did in the estimation of
the retirement-choice models, we combine the paths that involve labor
market insurance into one stylized path. This means that the retirement
state is further divided into two pathways to retirement: the old-age and the
labor market insurance pathway.
Each state has diﬀerent ﬁnancial implications for the public sector. To
calculate these, we consider all expected income and payroll tax payments,
VAT, and payments from the income security system between age 55 and
108. All future payments are discounted back to age 55 using a 3 percent
real interest rate. For workers for whom we cannot observe labor earnings,
we use a three-year average of earnings before the exit from the labor 
force to predict this missing information. In addition to that, for workers
younger than age 55, we upgrade the earnings by the age-speciﬁc average
increase in earnings.
10.4.2 Predicting the Probability for Each State
In order to predict the income streams we also need the probabilities for
each individual to end up in each state. Since there are three diﬀerent states
at each age, these calculations have to be made stepwise.
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5. The individual rather than the household is the sampling unit.We use the estimated econometric model described in section 10.3 to
predict individual retirement hazards at each age. That is, we use the char-
acteristics of each individual and use the estimated probit equation to ob-
tain the conditional probabilities. The covariates include the economic in-
centive variables; that is, we are able to predict the probability of exiting to
retirement for alternative income security policies. Using the predicted re-
tirement hazard and gender-speciﬁc life tables, we can calculate the prob-
ability of exiting to retirement or death at each age.
For the probability of ﬁnancing the exit from the labor market by labor
market insurance, rather than old-age pension, we assign the probability
observed in the data to that path conditionalon exiting from the labor mar-
ket at a particular age. Note that this is diﬀerent from the strategy we used
in the estimation, where we used the probability of being granted beneﬁts
from a labor market insurance program unconditionalon applying for such
insurance or leaving the labor force. Both of these sets of probabilities are
shown in ﬁgure 10.1. The base probabilities are also used for the Actuarial
Reform and the Common Reform.
10.4.3 Handling Spouses in the Simulation
In the estimation of the retirement choice model, the economic position
of the spouse was allowed to inﬂuence the retirement probability of the
sample individual through lifetime income and social security wealth. On
the other hand, we made the simplifying assumption that retirement be-
havior was ﬁxed. Assuming ﬁxed behavior of the spouse is obviously not
satisfactory in simulations of ﬁnancial implications of policy reforms,
since some of the ﬁnancial impact may come through behavioral changes
of the spouses, through changes in the size of the sample individual’s in-
come security wealth.
In the Swedish income security system this interaction transpires only
through survivor beneﬁts and housing allowances. The income of the
spouse does not inﬂuence income taxes paid by the individual. The rules
for housing allowances are very complicated, and the overall importance
of housing allowances for incentives and beneﬁt ﬂows is rather limited. For
this reason we have treated them as if they were individual beneﬁts, as part
of a simpliﬁed model of housing allowances. Given this simpliﬁcation, it is
possible to calculate the taxes paid and the beneﬁts received for our sample
on an individual basis. We use information about the spouse (including
predicted behavioral responses to reform) in order to estimate survivor
beneﬁt payments to the primary sample individual, but the estimate of ﬁ-
nancial eﬀects is only based on the 1940 cohort primary sample. This strat-
egy means that men and women are treated in the same way, which is de-
sirable, since labor force participation for women in the 1940 cohort is
almost the same as that for men.
To take this behavioral change into account, we follow a three-step
Financial Implications of Income Security Reforms in Sweden 425procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we calculate the ISS ﬂows for each age of the
sample individual conditional on retirement of the spouse at each age be-
tween 55 and 70. In the second step, we predict retirement probabilities of
the spouse, using the same model as for the sample individual. Finally, in
the third step, for each age of the sample individual we average the ISS
ﬂows of the individual in the sample using the weights of the predicted re-
tirement probabilities of the spouse.
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Fig. 10.1 Probability of access to the labor market insurance pathway and proba-
bility of using the labor market insurance pathway conditional on retirement age: A,
Probability of access to the labor market insurance pathway by age; B, Probability
of using the labor market insurance pathway conditional on retirement age
A
B10.4.4 Hypothetical Reforms of the Income Security System
We will simulate the ﬁnancial implications of three hypothetical reforms
of Sweden’s income security system. The reforms are rather diﬀerent in
their design. The ﬁrst reform delays eligibility of all pension beneﬁts by
three years. The second introduces an actuarial adjustment in the labor
market insurance programs. All other rules of the baseline system, includ-
ing eligibility ages, are retained. The third reform replaces the entire in-
come security system with a pension that replaces 60 percent of average
earnings during the best forty years. This reform is referred to as the Com-
mon Reform, since it allows for cross-country comparisons with results
from the other chapters in this volume.
Reform 1: Delaying Eligibility by Three Years
As we explained in section 10.2, most Swedish old-age pension beneﬁts
have a normal retirement age at 65 but can be claimed from age 60. Also,
the labor market insurance programs depend on age. The probability of be-
ing admitted DI increases with age, and the prevalence of older workers be-
ing admitted to long-term sickness as well as unemployment insurance is
also greater than in younger age groups. In addition, rules on mandatory
retirement age in the Swedish labor market will also aﬀect the dependence
between age and labor force participation rates.
Delaying eligibility ages in the old-age pension system, and the proba-
bility of being eligible for labor market insurance programs decreases the
value of the ISW, since each worker can expect either fewer beneﬁt pay-
ments or a larger actuarial adjustment compared to the current system.
Since we estimated a positive eﬀect of ISW on retirement probability, we
expect the reform to delay retirement.
In simulating the eﬀects of delaying the eligibility ages in the income
security system, a key issue is how to separate the eﬀects of economic in-
centives—both through the old-age pension programs and labor market
insurance, through changes in the probability of being eligible for bene-
ﬁts—from the eﬀects from mandatory retirement ages and latent retire-
ment behavior speciﬁc to age. Our strategy to deal with this issue is to do a
sensitivity analysis that produces a lower and an upper bound for the eﬀect
on retirement behavior from the reform.
To carry out this sensitivity analysis we do three diﬀerent simulations. In
the ﬁrst simulation (S1), we use the model with a linear speciﬁcation in
age(M1). In the second one (S2), we use the model with age dummies (M2).
In the third simulation (S3), we again use the M2 model, but now we shift
the age dummies by three years. The S2 simulation constitutes a lower
bound for the predicted eﬀect of the reform, since it implicitly assumes that
the over-parameterized dummy variable speciﬁcation in age only reﬂects
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ages on the labor market. The S3 simulation constitutes an upper bound
for the predicted eﬀect by implicitly making the equally unrealistic as-
sumption that the dummy variable speciﬁcation only reﬂects the unmea-
sured economic incentives generated by the income security system.
Reform 2: Extension of the Actuarial Adjustment
In this reform, the actuarial adjustment is changed to 6 percent for each
year of early withdrawal before the normal retirement age at 65. This
means that the actuarial adjustment is maintained in the public pension
system (for ages 60 to 64) as well as in the occupational pension schemes
for white collar workers in the private sector and employed in the central
government. Also, the pension plan for blue collar workers in the private
sector is maintained, since it cannot be claimed before age 65.
The actuarial adjustment in the occupational pension system for em-
ployees in the municipalities is somewhat increased, and the actuarial ad-
justment in ages 66 to 70 in the public system is reduced from 8.4 percent
per year. However, the major change implied by this reform is that an ac-
tuarial adjustment is applied also for the disability insurance and for those
who exit from the labor market through the unemployment or sickness in-
surance. This change is likely to increase the accrual in individual income
security wealth of staying in the labor force, and thereby increases the eco-
nomic incentives of staying in the labor force.
Reform 3: Change to a Common System
In this reform, the entire income security system is replaced with a pen-
sion system where the beneﬁt is calculated as 60 percent of average earn-
ings during the best 40 years if the worker retires at a normal retirement age
at 65. It can, however, be claimed from age 60 with a lifelong actuarial ad-
justment of 6 percent per year of early withdrawal, and delayed until age
70 with a symmetric actuarial adjustment. All labor market insurance pro-
grams are abolished in this hypothetical reform.
The eﬀect of the reform on the economic incentives is less transparent
compared to the Three-Year Reform. In general, most workers will experi-
ence a substantial reduction in their income security wealth, since the
current system, in general—except for very high-income earners—has a
higher replacement level, including the occupational pensions. There is
also an eﬀect from the abolition of the labor market insurance programs on
income security wealth. The actuarial adjustments are very similar to those
in the current old-age pension system. However, the abolition of the labor
market insurance programs implies that we can expect an eﬀect on the ac-
crual measures as well.
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To measure the total ﬁnancial eﬀect of a reform in the income security
system we use the individual Income Security Wealth (ISW), as deﬁned in
equation (2). The total ﬁnancial eﬀect is then deﬁned as the aggregate
diﬀerences between the ISW under the prereform policy regime and the
postreform regime, respectively. Within a given policy regime, the individ-
ual ISW depends in each period on whether the individual remains in the
labor force and on survival. It is, however, possible to calculate ISW, con-
ditional on that the individual is each of the forty-eight states and for the
pre- and postreform policy regimes, respectively. In the sample, the total
eﬀect can be calculated as















where P is denotes the probability of each of the forty-eight states between
age 56 and 79 of being in the labor force, retired, or dead for a particular
individual i. The superscripts B and R denote the pre- and postreform pol-
icy regimes, respectively. That is, at age 55 all members of the sample are
alive and in the labor force. At age 56 each individual will have a probabil-
ity of being dead and a probability of being in the labor force under the pre-
reform policy regime, which is diﬀerent from that in the postreform regime.
This is true at age 57 and each age until 78. At age 79 we assume that all in-
dividuals have retired.
The total ﬁnancial eﬀect of a reform of the income security system can
be decomposed in two components. We call the ﬁrst component the me-
chanicaleﬀect. This is the predicted ﬁnancial implication of the reform un-
der the assumption that the workers do not change their labor supply be-
havior as a response to the reform. The second component, the behavioral
eﬀect, is the ﬁnancial eﬀect that can be referred to as the predicted change
in the workers’ labor supply behavior. This eﬀect is ignored in ﬁnancial pre-
dictions of reforms in the income security system that do not take labor
supply considerations into account.




R to equation (3) we obtain
the following decomposition:






























where the ﬁrst right hand side term within parenthesis is the behavioral
eﬀect and second term the mechanical eﬀect. For the mechanical eﬀect, the
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ior, are maintained, while the ISW in each state is calculated under the pre-
and postreform regime, respectively. Conversely, for the behavioral eﬀect,
the ISW under the postreform is used for both terms, while the ﬁrst term
uses state probabilities for the postregimes and the second term uses pre-
reform ones.
10.5 Results
The predictions of the overall ﬁnancial implications of the hypothetical
reforms are shown in tables 10.4 and 10.5. Table 10.4 shows the outcomes
measured in expected present value per person in 1995, that is, at age 55 for
the individuals in the sample. Throughout the analysis, we use a 3 percent
discount rate. Euros per person in 2001 prices is used as currency unit.6
Table 10.4 also shows the percentage change of the three diﬀerent reforms
relative to the current system.
Table 10.4 contains six main panels. Each panel shows the results from a
combination of model speciﬁcation, either the peak or option value ac-
crual measure, and the three diﬀerent simulation strategies explained in
section 10.4. Each main panel contains results on six diﬀerent simulated
outcomes for the current system and for the three hypothetical reforms, re-
spectively.
The ﬁrst row shows the expected present value of all future beneﬁts from
the public pension system. The pension beneﬁts from the occupational
pension schemes, which are considered in the incentive calculations, since
they contribute to net income after retirement, are deducted in order to fo-
cus on ﬁnancial implications for the public sector. To also show the total ﬁ-
nancial implications for the average worker, the second row shows total
beneﬁts, including occupational pension beneﬁts.
The third through the ﬁfth row shows the average present value on diﬀer-
ent taxes paid directly or indirectly by the worker. The third row shows the
payroll tax, the fourth the income tax, and the ﬁfth the VAT and indirect
taxes.7 Finally, the sixth row shows the sum of all these taxes.
Table 10.5 shows the decomposition, explained in section 10.4.5, of the
total ﬁnancial implication of the reforms in a mechanical and a behavioral
eﬀect. As in table 10.4, the results in table 10.5 are divided into six main
panels, depending on the combination of model speciﬁcation and simula-
tion strategy. Instead of the outcomes for the three diﬀerent tax categories,
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6. We have used the exchange rate between SEK and euro on January 1, 2001 (9.3175 SEK/
Euro).
7. To be able to estimate the eﬀect of income changes on VAT and other indirect tax pay-
ments, we need a tax rate for the combined eﬀect from these taxes. This is set to 22 percent
and is obtained from the ratio between the aggregate sum of all indirect tax payments and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6each panel in table 10.5 contains two additional items. The ﬁrst one, Net
Change, measures the change in the beneﬁts from the public income secu-
rity system minus the changes in tax payment for each reform relative to
the current system. The second item measures this as a percentage share of
the beneﬁts from the public income security system under the current
regime.
In analyzing the results we will ﬁrst look separately at the background
of the results in table 10.4 and 10.5 for each of the three reforms. We then
look at the decomposition of the total ﬁnancial eﬀects in a mechanical
and a behavioral eﬀect, as described in section 10.4. Finally, we analyze
the income distribution implications by showing separately how the dif-
ferent quintiles in the distribution of lifetime income are aﬀected by the
reforms.
10.5.1 Three-Year Reform
Obtaining the predictions and the decomposition analysis presented in
tables 10.4 and 10.5 involves several steps. To explain these steps, and to
thereby give an assessment of the reliability of the predictions, we will ﬁrst
explain the mechanical eﬀects of the age-shift reform—mechanical in the
sense that the outcomes are measured assuming no change of labor force
exit at diﬀerent ages; that is, the behavioral responses are not taken into ac-
count. We then present the predictions of the behavioral changes implied
by the reform; and, ﬁnally, we present the predictions of the ﬁnancial out-
come, that is, combining the predictions of the mechanical and behavioral
changes.
Panel A of ﬁgure 10.2 shows the gross income security wealth, exclud-
ing occupational pensions, at age 55 by diﬀerent ages of labor force exit
for the current income security system and the policy implied by the
Three-Year Reform, respectively. It can be seen that the average social se-
curity wealth is somewhat higher under the Three-Year Reform regime for
most ages, up to age 62. This is due to the fact that the probability of us-
ing the labor market insurance programs conditional on age of labor force
exit is higher for younger age groups. Since these probabilities are shifted
by three years in the Three-Year Reform, the ISW at a given age of exit will
be higher under the postreform regime. Between age 62 and 71, when most
workers exit the labor market, the ISW is substantially higher under the
current regime, due to the higher actuarial adjustment under the postre-
form rules.
For measuring the budget implications for the public sector of the re-
form, it is necessary to also consider all possible tax payments to the
public sector. Panel B of ﬁgure 10.2 shows the changes in the present value
of the total taxes by age of labor force exit. It can be seen that the taxes
paid are markedly lower under the postreform regime between age 62 and
Financial Implications of Income Security Reforms in Sweden 43571. This reﬂects the lower replacement and consumption levels under this
regime.
The diﬀerences in pre- and postreform regimes conditional on age of
labor force exit, shown in panels A and B of ﬁgure 10.2 weighted by the pre-
reform-state probabilities sum up to the mechanical eﬀect shown in table
10.5. It can be seen that the reform implies that both beneﬁt payments and
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Fig. 10.2 Results for the Three-Year Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force exit;
B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit, OV S1
model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of age of
labor force exit, OV S2 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S2 model;
G, Distribution of age of labor force exit, OV S3 model; H, Total eﬀect by age of re-
tirement, OV S3 model
A
Btaxes decrease, which was also evident from the ﬁgures.8 The net change,
however, is positive, which implies that the tax decrease dominates and the
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8. It can be seen in the second column of table 10.5 that this mechanical eﬀect varies be-
tween the simulation where the linear speciﬁcation in age is used and the two speciﬁcations
with age dummies. This is due to the diﬀerent weighting of the diﬀerent states. Since the
dummy variable speciﬁcation provides weighting that is closer to the actual behavior under
the prereform regime, this is probably a better prediction of the mechanical eﬀect.
Fig. 10.2 (continued)
C
DFig. 10.2 (cont.) Results for the Three-Year Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force
exit; B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit,
OV S1 model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of
age of labor force exit, OV S2 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S2
model; G, Distribution of age of labor force exit, OV S3 model; H, Total eﬀect by




Htotal mechanical eﬀect of the reform represents a deﬁcit for the public sec-
tor. This deﬁcit is comparatively small—it corresponds to only 2.3 percent
of the total beneﬁts from the prereform public income security system.
The predictions of the behavioral response of the reform are shown in
panels C, E, and G of ﬁgure 10.2 for the option value speciﬁcation and the
three diﬀerent simulation strategies. Each ﬁgure shows retirement proba-
bilities for the pre- and postreform regimes, respectively, for each age be-
tween 55 and 75. It is evident from these ﬁgures that all simulation strate-
gies predict delayed retirement as a result of the reform. The peak value
predictions are not shown in the ﬁgure, but the results are also quantita-
tively fairly robust with respect to choice of incentive measure (peak or op-
tion value). However, the predicted size of the behavioral eﬀect is very
diﬀerent between S2 and S3.
In section 10.4.4, Reform 1, we discussed the methodological back-
ground of the three simulation strategies. One interpretation of the large
diﬀerence between the S2 and S3 results is that there are important aspects
of the economic incentives that are not measured by the incentive measures
in the model, which, in turn, are caught by the over-parameterized dummy-
variable speciﬁcation. It is, however, also possible that the dummy vari-
ables reﬂect institutions in the labor market, like rules on mandatory re-
tirement ages and social norms, which are likely to aﬀect the retirement
behavior but are omitted in the econometric model. For this particular re-
form, which includes increasing the ERA from 60 to 63 and reducing ac-
cess to labor market insurance programs at each age, the large behavioral
response predicted by the S3 strategy might be more plausible than for
other conceivable reforms.
Table 10.5 shows that all models and simulation strategies predict a ﬁ-
nancial surplus for both the income security system and the entire public
sector from the reform. However, as expected from the simulation of the re-
tirement behavior, the magnitude of the surplus diﬀers substantially be-
tween the S2 and S3 simulations. This diﬀerence is largest when the peak
value measure is used for measuring economic incentives, where the diﬀer-
ence in net change is almost ﬁve times as large in the S3 simulation, com-
pared to about three times as large when the option value measure is em-
ployed. This diﬀerence follows from both a higher prediction of the S2
lower bound, about 14.2 thousand euros compared to the 11.7 for the op-
tion value measure and a higher prediction of the S3 upper bound, 43.0
thousand euros compared to 51.8. The prediction from the S1 simulation
is, as expected from the simulation methodology explained in section
10.4.4, Reform 1, between the S2 and S3 lower and upper bounds, being
very close, both in the peak and option value models, to the lower bounds.
The simulations of the behavioral eﬀects also show that the greatest
source of the surplus from the reform for the entire public sector (the net
change) comes from greater tax payments. The share of the surplus that
440 Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svenssoncomes from more tax payments varies between 62 and 65 percent, depend-
ing on model and simulation strategy.
The last step in obtaining the ﬁnancial implications of the reform is to
combine the mechanical, ﬁnancial predictions with the behavioral ones.
Figure 10.2, panel D, F, and H show the total eﬀect by age of retirement.
The shaded bars show the total change in present value for all beneﬁts (ex-
cept occupational pensions) by age of labor force exit. The nonshaded ones
give the corresponding information for the size of the total net eﬀect. A
negative outcome gives a surplus for the public sector from the reform cor-
responding to a particular age of labor force exit.
The total ﬁnancial eﬀect for the public income security system (beneﬁts)
and the total public sector (net change), respectively, shown in table 10.5,
can be obtained by summing the two sets of bars over all ages of labor force
exit. The net change row is also shown in ﬁgure 10.5. It is evident from the
results in table 10.5 that the ﬁnancial surplus from the behavioral eﬀect of
the reform is substantially larger than the mechanical. This result comes
out in all combinations of speciﬁcations and simulation strategy.
To sum up, the results on the ﬁrst reform show that there is large degree
of uncertainty, depending on the choice of simulation strategy. Using the
peak value measure, the net eﬀect on the ﬁnances of the entire public sec-
tor compared to the current system is about ﬁve times as large when the
second simulation strategy is used compared to the ﬁrst one. The diﬀerence
comes from both smaller beneﬁt payments and larger tax contributions.
All predictions, however, give substantial ﬁnancial implications of the ﬁrst
reform. For the lowest estimate, the diﬀerence compared to the current sys-
tem is about 5 billion SEK, which corresponds to about 0.2 percent of
GDP in 2001.
10.5.2 The Actuarial Reform
The corresponding results to those shown in the previous section for the
Three-Year Reform are obtained for the Actuarial Reform. As in the pre-
vious section, we start the analysis of the simulation results by looking at
the mechanical eﬀects. We then turn to the behavioral eﬀects and, ﬁnally,
to the total ﬁnancial implications of the reform.
Figure 10.3, panel A shows the mechanical reform eﬀect on beneﬁt pay-
ments from the public income security system by age of exit from the labor
market. The results here are very diﬀerent compared to those obtained for
the Three-Year Reform. As expected, the present value of the payments,
conditional on labor force exit in young ages, the ages when the actuarial
adjustment of the labor market insurance programs in the reform have a
large eﬀect, are substantially reduced compared to the current system.
Also, after age 64, as the last year in the labor force, there are still slightly
higher payments under the current system. This is due to the fact that the
0.7 percent per month (8.4 percent per year) actuarial increase for delaying
Financial Implications of Income Security Reforms in Sweden 441retirement after age 65 under the current system is actually higher than the
6 percent actuarial adjustment implied by the reform.
Figure 10.3, panel B shows the corresponding results for tax payments.
As expected, tax payments decrease for all ages of labor force exit. The eﬀect
is largest conditional on early ages of labor market exit, where the largest
eﬀects on payments from the public income security system were located.
The mechanical eﬀect is summarized in table 10.5. Comparing the re-
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Fig. 10.3 Results for the Actuarial Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force exit;
B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit, OV S1
model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of age of
labor force exit, OV S3 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S3 model
A
Bsults to those of the Three-Year Reform, it can be seen that the eﬀects are
much larger for this reform—both for income security payments and taxes.
Unlike the previous reform, the reductions in income security payments
dominate the reduction in tax payments, resulting in a surplus for the en-
tire public sector (net change) from the mechanical eﬀect.
Turning to the behavioral eﬀects, ﬁgure 10.3, panel C and E shows that
the eﬀect toward delayed labor market exit is much smaller compared to
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Fig. 10.3 (continued)
C
DFig. 10.3 (cont.) Results for the Actuarial Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force
exit; B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit,
OV S1 model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of
age of labor force exit, OV S3 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S3
model
E
Fthe Three-Year Reform. Since neither the ERA nor NRA are changed
from the current income security system, S2 and S3 are identical, which
means that we only need to consider four combinations of simulation strat-
egy and model speciﬁcation. Comparing the results in ﬁgure 10.3, panel C
and E shows that the predicted eﬀects on behavior are, in general, smaller
when the dummy-variable speciﬁcation is used.
Again, table 10.5 summarizes the behavioral eﬀects. It is evident from
these results that the ﬁnancial implications from the behavioral eﬀect can
be ignored. The main explanation for this result is, of course, the small, pre-
dicted changes in retirement behavior. Also, in the age interval where any
diﬀerences were predicted, the current system is very similar to that under
the reform.
The total eﬀect, shown in table 10.5 and ﬁgure 10.5, summarizes the re-
sults for the Actuarial Reform. These results show that the eﬀect is some-
what larger than the predicted lower bound of the Three-Year Reform:
around 7 percent compared to around 5 percent of the expected payments
from public income security under the current system. However, compared
to the upper bound of the Three-Year Reform, the eﬀect of this reform is
substantially smaller.
10.5.3 The Common Reform
The mechanical eﬀects of the Common Reform have, as can be seen in
ﬁgure 10.4 panel A and B, a similar pattern to those of the Actuarial Re-
form, discussed in the previous subsection; the results from the Common
Reform are, however, somewhat stronger for young ages of labor market
exit. This is due to the fact that the labor market insurance programs are
abolished for these ages, while only actuarially reduced under the Actuar-
ial Reform policy.
Again, the mechanical eﬀects are summarized in table 10.5. These re-
sults conﬁrm that the mechanical eﬀects on payments from the public in-
come security system are stronger in the Common compared to the Actu-
arial Reform. However,  the largest diﬀerence between the mechanical
eﬀects of these reforms is on taxes: the reduction in tax payments is more
than twice as large in the Common Reform compared to the Actuarial
Reform. The background to this result is that the occupational pension
is abolished in the Common Reform. Also, the payments from the income
security system are capped at the 90th percentile of the income distribu-
tion. As a result, total beneﬁt levels are substantially lower than under the
actuarial adjustment and current policy regime, which can be seen from
the second row of table 10.4. Beneﬁts, including occupational pension
beneﬁts, are reduced by 29 percent, compared to 15 percent for the Actu-
arial Reform and 9 percent for the Three-Year Reform. Tax payments,
especially from high-income retirees, are therefore reduced. The mechani-
cal eﬀect on the entire public sector is much smaller than for the Actuarial
Financial Implications of Income Security Reforms in Sweden 445Reform, and is actually zero in the simulation with the peak value incen-
tive measure and the dummy-variable speciﬁcation.
Turning to the behavioral eﬀects, ﬁgure 10.4, panel C and E show much
stronger behavioral eﬀects of the Common Reform compared to the Actu-
arial Reform. This is expected, since the Common Reform implies a more
radical reduction of the income security beneﬁts. This implies that the age
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Fig. 10.4 Results for the Common Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force exit;
B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit, OV S1
model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of age of
labor force exit, OV S3 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S3 model
A
Bdistribution of exit from the labor market shifts to ages when the present
value of the payments from the income security system are larger, which, in
turn, implies that the behavioral eﬀect on beneﬁts from the income secu-
rity system is positive. This result can be seen for all four combinations of
incentive measure and simulation strategies in table 10.5. However, this
shift also implies that tax payments will increase, which induces a ﬁnancial
surplus for the entire public sector. As can be seen in table 10.5, this eﬀect
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Fig. 10.4 (continued)
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Fig. 10.4 (cont.) Results for the Common Reform: A, SSW by age of labor force
exit; B, Taxes by age of labor force exit; C, Distribution of age of labor force exit,
OV S1 model; D, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S1 model; E, Distribution of
age of labor force exit, OV S3 model; F, Total eﬀect by age of retirement, OV S3
model
E
Fdominates, and the net change is very close to that obtained for the Actu-
arial Reform.
For the Common Reform, the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects work in
the same direction. This implies that there will be a ﬁnancial surplus from
the reform. For the Actuarial Reform, almost the entire eﬀect can be at-
tributed to the mechanical eﬀect, while the behavioral eﬀect dominates for
the Common Reform.
10.5.4 The Total Eﬀect of the Reforms as Shares of GDP and the
Relative Importance of Mechanical and Behavioral Eﬀects
Figure 10.5, panels A–C show the decomposition of the total ﬁnancial
implications of the three hypothetical reforms as shares of Sweden’s GDP
for 2001. Relating the eﬀects to GDP shows the economic importance of
implementing the reforms for the group of individuals that form the popula-
tion of our sample.As we described in section 10.4, we use a random sample
of individuals who were born in 1940 and employees in 1995 at age 55.9
This group corresponds to 66 percent of all born in 1940 and living in Swe-
den in 1995. The size of this group is about 64,000 individuals.
Panel A of ﬁgure 10.5 reveals that the net eﬀect for the public sector ﬁ-
nances corresponds to between 0.2 and 0.4 percent of GDP for the lower-
bound prediction of the Three-Year Reform and all predictions for the
Actuarial and Common reforms. Considering that the population under
study corresponds to only about 1.5 percent of the total labor force, the
eﬀect must be considered to be of economic signiﬁcance. Figure 10.5, panel
A also shows that the upper-bound prediction of the eﬀect of the Three-
Year Reform gives a net eﬀect between 1 and 1.3 percent of GDP. This is,
however, likely to be an overestimate of the true eﬀect.
Figure 10.5 also highlights the very diﬀerent allocation between me-
chanical and behavioral eﬀects between the reforms. An interesting result
is that the behavioral eﬀect is largest, even for the lower bound simulations,
for the Three-Year Reform. The only reform for which the mechanical
eﬀects seem to be important is the Actuarial Reform.
10.5.5 Income Distribution Eﬀects of the Hypothetical Reforms
The simulations of the three hypothetical reforms also allow us to look
at distributional implications. To do that we use family lifetime income
from labor10 to split the cohort sample into ﬁve quintile groups. The ﬁrst
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9. In the labor force, not self-employed.
10. We use the sum of labor earning for the forty best years (highest earnings) since age 20.
For married couples we sum earnings from both spouses. Information on family composition
is obtained from 1995, and we assume that each individual has been married (or in consen-
sual union) to the same individual his or her entire life. The sample is divided into separate
quintiles for married and single and then merged together. This means that we get the same
shares of married and single individuals in each quintile.quintile constitutes the 20 percent richest households; the second includes
households with lifetime income between the 60th and the 80th percentiles,
and so on until the poorest 20 percent, which forms the ﬁfth group.
The results are shown in tables 10.6 and 10.7. The S1 simulation strategy
is used for obtaining the results in table 10.6 and S3 for the results in table
10.7. The option value (OV) accrual measure was used for both sets of re-
sults. The key result in these tables is the average change in net public sec-
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Fig. 10.5 Fiscal implications of reform as a percent of GDP: A, Three-Year Re-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9tor payments in the quintile, measured as a share of the average present
value of beneﬁt payments in the current system. This amount measures
how the burden of the decrease in public sector net payments is divided be-
tween diﬀerent parts of the income distribution relative to their original
share of expected payments from the public income security system. Note
that the percentage change of expected discounted net income will be dif-
ferent, since they also include occupational pension payments.
Although the results in tables 10.6 and 10.7 are in some cases on some-
what diﬀerent levels, they show a very similar pattern regarding how the
burdens of the reforms are distributed. The Three-Year Reform is progres-
sive in the sense that the upper quintiles in the income distribution experi-
ence a larger burden of the reform, as a proportion of the average present
value of the expected payments from the income security system, than the
quintiles with less average lifetime income. The results for the Common
Reform, and to a less extent also for the Actuarial Reform show the oppo-
site pattern: the low-income quintile groups suﬀer from a larger average
burden of the reform than proportional to the average present value of
their expected payments from the current income security system.
There are two main reasons for the simulation results for the Three-Year
Reform. The ﬁrst reason is diﬀerences in changes in beneﬁt payments due
to the reform. Individuals in the low-income group have higher retirement
probabilities at relatively young ages. One part of the Three-Year Reform
is that the probability of access to the labor market insurance beneﬁts at
each age and the probabilities of receiving beneﬁts from a labor market in-
surance program, conditional on retirement at a particular age, are also
shifted by three years (see ﬁgure 10.1). The net eﬀect is that individuals in
the low-income group will experience an increased probability of receiving
beneﬁts from a labor market insurance program, and the beneﬁts from
these programs are not aﬀected by the reform. This is not true for the high-
income group, who, on average, retire at a much older age and have a lower
probability of being eligible for labor market insurance beneﬁts and, there-
fore, will suﬀer more from the shift in the actuarial adjustment implied by
the reform.
The second reason is that tax payments increase more in the high-income
group. Tax payments have three main components in this analysis: VAT, in-
come, and payroll taxes. Payments from income taxes and VAT will decrease
with the S1 simulation strategy, since the beneﬁt levels decrease as a result
of the reform. For the S3 case, the behavioral eﬀect is so large that it out-
weighs the negative mechanical eﬀects on income taxes and VAT. However,
payments through payroll taxes will always increase as a result of the de-
layed exit from the labor market, since payroll taxes are only paid by work-
ers in the labor force. The payroll tax increase as a percent of public beneﬁt
payments will be large in the high-income group, due to a lower replacement
rate and possibly also due to a larger behavioral response to the reform.
Financial Implications of Income Security Reforms in Sweden 455The result—that the Common Reform is regressive—also stems from
diﬀerences in retirement behavior between diﬀerent segments of the in-
come distribution. Since the low-income group, on average, retire earlier
and have a higher probability of being eligible for beneﬁts from a labor
market insurance program, they will, on average, suﬀer more when these
programs are replaced by an old-age pension scheme under the Common
Reform policy regime. This also applies to the Actuarial Reform, but to a
much less extent, since the labor market insurance programs are only sub-
ject to an actuarial adjustment under this policy regime.
10.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we use a labor supply model for the retirement decision
and a sample of workers born in 1940 to simulate the eﬀect on net public
sector payments of three hypothetical reforms of Sweden’s income security
system. The estimates of the magnitude of the eﬀects, disregarding the
upper bound of the Three-Year Reform, ranges between, on average, ap-
proximately 8,000 to 11,000 euros in present value of all future transactions
for the Three-Year Reform, to about 13,000 euros for the Actuarial Re-
form, and to about 15,000 euros for the Common Reform. These average
eﬀects correspond to between about 0.2 and 0.4 percent of Sweden’s GDP
in 2001, for 66 percent of the 1940 cohort.
These total eﬀects are achieved very diﬀerently between the reforms. For
the Three-Year Reform, the entire eﬀect comes from the behavioral eﬀect.
The mechanical eﬀect actually works in the opposite direction. For the Ac-
tuarial Reform, the entire diﬀerence comes from the mechanical eﬀect,
while for the Common Reform the mechanical eﬀect is close to zero and,
again, the behavioral eﬀect is the most important.
Also, the simulated eﬀects on income distribution are very diﬀerent be-
tween the reforms. The Three-Year Reform is progressive in the sense that
a larger burden of the reform, measured as a share of the present value of
expected payments from the income security system, is attributed to house-
holds with relatively high lifetime earnings. The opposite is true for both
the other reforms, although to a larger extent for the Common Reform.
The backgrounds to the results were found mainly in the fact that low-
income workers, on average, exit earlier from the labor market and are
more likely to be eligible for beneﬁts from a labor market insurance pro-
gram.
A general conclusion from the study is that both diﬀerences in retire-
ment behavior between diﬀerent groups of workers, in particular for the
distribution analysis, and behavioral responses to the reforms, in particu-
lar for the total eﬀect of both the Three-Year and the Common reforms, are
very important for analyzing economic implications of reforms in the in-
come security system.
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